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A B S T R A C T
 
This study evaluates the methodology of payment for ecosystem services (PES) adopted in 
the Oasis Project in order to compensate landowners that voluntarily accept to conserve 
natural forest areas associated with watershed protection, with special focus on the 
experience of Apucarana, in the state of Paraná, Brazil. It is argued that the establishment 
of a payment scheme combining the opportunity cost of land and indices for the quality 
and quantity of conservation (considering water resources, natural areas conservation, and 
best agricultural practices) guarantees more efficiency in terms of the conservation area 
that can be achieved using the same financial resources. This study also discusses other 
conditions for the successful implementation of new PES opportunities in Brazil, such as 
the involvement of local authorities, monitoring, and sources of funding.
© 2014 Associação Brasileira de Ciência Ecológica e Conservação. 
Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda.
Introduction
There is an increasing perception regarding the importance 
of conserving ecosystem services for human well-being, 
including biodiversity conservation, regulation of climate, 
soil conservation, carbon storage, nutrient cycling, and water 
resources, among many others. There are many different 
definitions for ecosystem services in the literature, for 
example, those that provide the conditions and processes 
to support life and, direct or indirectly, contribute to human 
survival and well-being (Medeiros & Young, 2011; FAO, 2007; 
ISA, 2007; Robertson & Wunder, 2005). 
However, there is wide criticism to regulation restricted to 
command and control instruments, such as fines and other 
penalties for those that do not comply with the environmental 
legislation. The main reason presented is the lack of flexibility 
provided to economic agents to solve these problems. Some 
authors (Young et al., 2009) discuss these issues in the context 
of Brazilian forest conservation, with the similar result that 
command and control policies have been insufficient to reach 
the desired goals of conservation. 
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Therefore, the use of economic instruments is important 
to provide flexibility in the compliance of environmental 
targets, as a complementary tool to the command and 
control approach. In Brazil, there are already some interesting 
experiences of economic instrument in environmental policy, 
as demonstrated by Young (2005) and Medeiros & Young (2011), 
including the payment for watershed protection, described 
in this article. Although there has been some progress in the 
development and adoption of environmental policies (Nepstad 
et al., 2009), these efforts cannot counteract pressures from the 
driving forces of the country’s economic model, such as urban 
expansion, increasing human populations, as well as energy 
and material intensive production patterns (Killeen, 2007). 
According to Balvanera et al. (2011), the study of the linkages 
between ecosystems and societies in Latin America started in 
the 1980s under the conceptual frameworks of ethnoecology, 
cultural ecology, political ecology, or societal metabolism. 
However, the term “ecosystem services” was first used in a Latin 
America publication in 1997 (Fearnside, 1997), shortly after the 
publication of the seminal study by Costanza et al.  (1997). 
A system of payments for ecosystem (or environmental) 
services (PES) has a very simple logic: to increase the income 
of economic activities compatible with conservation, in order 
to encourage the sustainable use of natural resources, while 
at the same time penalizing predatory activities. In an ideal 
system, the polluter or user must pay so that the protector or 
provider receives. Thus, there is an incentive to conserve the 
goods and services freely provided by the natural environment 
that are of interest, direct or indirect, to human beings. 
Hence, a PES is a self-interest system based on the economic 
assumption that agents tend to change their behavior and 
attitudes according to the incentives or penalties, in order to 
maximize their profits or utility, as far as those who benefit 
from the externalities provided by conservation are willing to 
pay (Wunder, 2005). 
Furthermore, PES should also be aimed at reducing poverty; 
how that could be implemented has been the subject of heated 
discussion (Ferraro, Hanauer & Sims 2011; Rolón et al. 2011). 
Projects with emphasis in both services and poverty reduction 
are being implemented (Estrada-Carmona & DeClerk, 2009). 
However, poverty reduction will not be the focus of this study.
The main objective of this study is to analyze a PES 
program established in Brazil called the Oasis Project (Young 
et al., 2012), and to evaluate its main positive and negative 
aspects, in order to contribute to the establishment of similar 
initiatives in the present and in the future.
Context
The Oasis Project, coordinated by the non-governmental 
organization Foundation Group Boticário of Nature Protection 
(FGBPN), in association with municipal governments and 
sponsoring partners, such as the Mitsubishi Foundation and 
the Water Supply and Sanitation Company of the State of 
Paraná (SANEPAR). Currently, the Oasis Project is established 
in three Brazilian municipalities: Apucarana (Paraná state 
– PR), São Paulo (São Paulo state – SP) and São Bento do Sul 
(Santa Catarina state – SC). Besides them, there are other 
municipalities in advanced negotiation to implement the 
Oasis Project in their territory. The Oasis Project consists of 
a PES focused on watershed protection through native forest 
conservation in privately owned land. The first experiences 
were implemented in São Paulo and Apucarana and thus were 
the subject of this study (the implementation in São Bento do 
Sul started only in 2012). The goal is to benefit landowners who 
historically conserve forests and springs on their properties, 
but also to encourage forest recovery, since both contribute 
positively to the protection of water flows (FGBPN, 2011a). 
The Oasis Project started in São Paulo in 2006, with 
resources from the Mitsubishi Foundation and support from 
FGBPN (FGBPN, 2011b). The positive evaluation has encouraged 
the replication of the experience, and Apucarana joined the 
project in 2009, through the municipal laws No. 058/09 and No. 
241/09, establishing a financial partnership with SANEPAR, in 
which SANEPAR transfers 1% of its receipts obtained in the 
municipality to the Environmental Municipal Fund. With these 
resources, the municipality pays the landowners participating 
in the project, with technical support from FGBPN. 
The first Oasis Project in São Paulo, differs from the other 
two programs already in place because it has few properties 
(only 13), and because they have a relatively large size, about 60 
hectares each, located in the extreme South of the municipality, 
in the Guarapiranga watershed (around 4 million people). 
Most importantly, these properties do not have agriculture as 
their main objective (they are usually leisure properties), and 
monthly payments oscillate between R$ 100 and R$ 7,000,00 per 
month, depending on environmental characteristics such as 
water density, forest conservation, and sanitation conditions. 
Meanwhile, the Oasis Project in Apucarana (Paraná state) 
presents a contrasting reality, with smaller average area 
(24 hectares), but all of them are dedicated to agricultural 
production. The number of properties is much larger: at 
the end of 2011, there were 133 properties participating in 
the program, with a total of 385 identified springs. Monthly 
payments range from R$ 80 to R$ 597 with the current 
formula calculation. Since the net income per property is 
approximately R$ 500 per month, PES corresponds to an 
increase in income ranging from 18% to 100%, depending on 
the production and property characteristics (FGBPN, 2011a). 
However, a series of problems related to the methodology 
originally adopted to establish the value of these payments, 
such as the lack of proportionality to the forest conservation 
area and the opportunity cost of land, resulted in a demand 
for a revision in these criteria.  A specific study was performed 
to propose a new formula for calculating the payments due to 
landowners, which is presented and discussed in this study. 
Finally, it is important to note that, later, the Oasis Project 
was extended to São Bento do Sul and Brumadinho (Minas 
Gerais state). However, these are very recent experiences, with 
no data available at the time of the study. For these reasons, 
the present article has used only data from the Apucarana 
experience. 
Material and methods
Original methodology to calculate payment values
The methodology originally adopted in Apucarana assumed 
that payments to landowners would be based only on 
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Proposition of a new methodology
In order to solve these problems, a new methodology proposed 
changes in many aspects in the calculation of PES, nevertheless, 
without altering the main spirit of the Oasis Project: to benefit 
privately owned land with forest conservation that helps to 
protect watersheds (Young, Bakker, Ferretti, Krieck & Atanazio, 
2012). Since 2012, this new methodology has been adopted as 
the standard approach in the Oasis Project (even though, for 
legal reasons, it was not possible to revise contracts that were 
already being executed before that date).
The idea is to combine a compensation value for the 
opportunity cost of land devoted to conservation with a bonus 
system for the ecosystem services identified in the property 
and/or best agricultural practices adopted. Therefore, not only 
are environmental variables considered, but economic criteria 
are also included in the calculation of the payments. 
Groups of variables 
The first stage was to elaborate groups of variables that are 
related to one of the three elements considered as crucial for 
the project: water protection, forest conservation, and best 
agricultural practices. Hence, three grades are given (G1, G2, 
and G3) to summarize these different criteria: 
  G1: Water protection 
  G2: Conservation of natural ecosystems 
  G3: Agricultural practices 
Total properties 133
Total area of properties contracted (hectares) 3,199
Protected natural area (hectares) 799
Number of protected springs 385
Highest monthly payment (R$) 576
Average amount of monthly payment (R$) 176
Lowest monthly payment (R$) 76
Source: Own elaboration, based on FGBPN data.
Table 1 - Oasis Project in Apucarana, 2011.
environmental aspects. Furthermore, the basic payment 
unit was the property, i.e., payments were equally paid for 
properties that have many different characteristics, including 
total area dedicated to conservation (see Appendix 1 for 
a detailed description of the methodology). This created a 
distortion in payment values, since there was no direct 
proportion between the conservation area and its opportunity 
costs. Therefore, the Oasis Project became very expensive, 
paying the highest value per hectare (on average) when 
compared to similar PES experiences in Brazil: Minas Gerais 
(Extrema) and Espírito Santo (“ProdutorES de Água”), where 
payment is made  by hectare (Zanella, 2012). Another problem 
was the arbitrary system introduced to benefit properties 
according to the number of springs and the connectivity with 
other properties, since payments grew at a geometric ratio. 
Table 1 shows how much was paid to landowners in 
Apucarana in 2011; R$ 576 was the highest value received per 
month per property, and R$ 76 was the lowest value.
Inside each grade, weights are given to variables so that 
each property receives financial resources due to its overall 
performance according to environmental, economic, and 
social criteria (Table 2). 
Reference variable – X 
A proxy for the opportunity cost of land was defined based 
on the reference value of the land: the variable “X” was set to 
correspond to a minimum compensation value that would be 
received for the area devoted to conservation. An initial value 
for “X” as 25% of the rent value of the land is suggested, but 
this value may change according to specific circumstances in 
each municipality. This reference value “X” would compensate, 
at least partially, the potential revenues from alternative low 
productivity activities, such as extensive cattle ranching.  The 
idea is that it is easier to compensate a landowner dedicated 
to low productivity cattle ranching than to high productivity 
cultivation, and thus PES is more likely to become effective 
where the opportunity cost of land is cheaper. 
The “X” variable represents the minimum compensation 
unit per hectare of land, but depending on other characteristics 
of the property (factors G1, G2, and G3), the total value received 
per hectare of conservation can increase considerably, as 
discussed below.
Forest conservation variable – Z 
The variable Z refers to the area under forest conservation 
or restoration practices in hectares, in each property. This 
information is important since payments are made based on 
area under conservation or restoration, based on Equation (1): 
Value PES = Z*X*[(1+ (G1)+(G2)+(G3)]                     (1)
Differently from the original model adopted in the early 
Oasis Project experiences, this new standard formula includes 
weights for each grade, suggesting (but not imposing, since 
municipalities are free to choose the specificities in the 
application of the equation) the following values: 
  G1 (Water protection) ranges between 0 and 1; 
  G2 (Conservation of natural ecosystems) ranges between 
0 and 2.5; 
  G3 (Agricultural practices) ranges between 0 and 1.5; 
Hence, the minimum value that a property would receive 
per hectare of conserved area is (suggested as) 25% of the 
Grade Variable 
Water protection Protected springs; protected rivers, 
streams, and lakes.
Conservation of 
natural ecosystems 
Formation of corridors; natural area; 
existence of private reserves (RPPN); % of 
conserved area. 
Agricultural practices Certified organic agriculture; rotation of 
cultivations; contour plowing/farming, and 
land with increased productivity.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 2 - Grades and respective components.
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and cultivation. Therefore, local politicians tend to react 
negatively to environmental protection policies, and this 
explains the very poor enforcement of the Brazilian Forest 
Code in the last decades. PES schemes intend to remedy this 
by providing economic incentives for conservation, but it also 
represents a public policy issue. The effective involvement 
of local authorities in the implementation of PES systems is 
essential for their acceptance by the local communities. 
Correct information is the first step, especially when the 
positive externalities of forest conservation in terms of 
benefits to agriculture are understood by rural producers in 
terms of watershed protection, pollination, pests control, 
and other ecosystem services (De Marco Jr. & Coelho, 2004; 
De Souza et al., 2008: Medeiros & Young, 2011). Therefore, it 
is required that local authorities become involved in actions 
that can be presented as “best cases”, and that PES systems 
are presented as a tool for rural development. In that sense, 
Apucarana is a good example, since the municipal agency 
(SEMATUR) has acted on two fronts: 
i. Directly through the coordination of the program, 
enhancing the perception of rural landowners regarding 
the importance of ecosystem services, especially water 
and soil conservation. SEMATUR employees help 
explain how the payment values are calculated, and 
the program’s success has resulted in an increasing 
number of candidates: at the end of 2010, there were 64 
properties enrolled, and at the end of 2011, the number 
of properties had risen to 133. 
ii. In the collaboration with the executive and legislative 
powers of Apucarana, including in the design of the 
Municipal Law (No. 058/09) that establishes the legal 
basis for the local implementation of the Oasis Project.
The presence of a well-known local coffee producer as 
coordinator of the Oasis project in Apucarana has helped 
to disseminate the information and to avoid mistrusts in 
the difficult relationship between program managers and 
landowners. Such direct involvement of a representative of 
farmers in the leadership of the PES is a measure that should 
be applied whenever possible, especially in more conservative 
rural areas.
Financing the project 
The strategy adopted in the Oasis Project is to establish 
partnerships with water supply companies to finance the 
payments to the properties, since the focus has been on 
watershed protection. In that sense, the PES is an incentive 
to improve the stability of water flows, with direct benefits to 
the water supply companies. Indeed, the resources to finance 
the Oasis Project in Apucarana are provided by the state water 
supply company (SANEPAR).
However, there remains a strong resistance among the 
Brazilian rural sector in accepting that, as the main user of 
water resources, it is in their own benefit to establish a system 
where water consumers pay for forest conservation or best 
agricultural practices in upstream properties. Due to this 
resistance, resources for PES systems are restricted to a small 
share of urban and industrial consumers, but mostly from 
public budget allocations.
renting price for cattle ranching (usually the lowest price 
for land use) if the property follows only the minimum 
requirements necessary to be accepted in the Oasis Project 
(essentially, to follow the environmental legislation and the 
specific demands imposed by each municipality). Conversely, 
according to the suggested weights, the maximum value can 
reach up to 1.5 times the renting price for cattle ranching (or 
six times the minimum value, per hectare). Hence, a positive 
incentive is established to induce landowners to increase not 
only the size of the forest conservation in their properties, 
but also to improve the quality of this conservation and to 
adopt best agricultural practices that are identified as more 
adequate to conserve ecosystem services. Appendix 2 details 
all the variables presented in the suggested calculation. 
Results and discussion
Simulating payments in Apucarana using the new PES formula
A simulation exercise was conducted for the municipality of 
Apucarana, using the existing data basis of properties enrolled 
in the Project, but with the proposed equation (1). 
To calibrate the model, the “X” variable (land reference value) 
was set at R$ 24/month (equivalent to 25% of the average land 
rental price in the region). According to the characteristics 
of the properties in Apucarana, the minimum value to be 
paid, per hectare, if equation 1 were applied, would be R$ 24/
hectare/month, while the maximum value (i.e. the property 
that is closest to the objectives of the Project) would be R$ 43/
hectare/month. 
The average value in Apucarana would be approximately 
R$ 31/ha/month. In absolute terms, considering the total 
conservation area in the property, the maximum payment 
would be R$ 862/month, while the minimum would be R$ 24 
/month (the disparity is a consequence of the difference in 
properties size), with an average value of R$ 176/property/
month. 
When results are compared with the original payments 
distribution in Apucarana, in which the average payment 
per property was R$ 186.65/month, it is notable that the 
new formula would provide greater efficiency, allowing extra 
resources to expand forest conservation into new properties, 
since payments are due only to the conservation area, rather 
than the total property.
Other issues and lessons from the Oasis Project 
The definition of the best formula to calculate payment values 
to rural landowners is not the only challenge to be addressed 
in the implementation of a PES scheme (Young et al., 2012). 
This section discusses three other elements that are relevant 
to the successful implementation of the Oasis Project and also 
to other PES systems: the involvement of local authorities, the 
funding for the payments, and the monitoring of properties.
Involvement of local authorities with the Program 
Forest conservation in private land requires setting aside land 
that would be used in alternative forms, such as ranching 
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One example is the PES system established in the State of 
Espírito Santo (ProdutorES de Água), where resources come 
from tax collection and royalties from hydropower generation, 
oil, and natural gas. This establishes a clear limit to the 
expansion of PES, since public budgets are limited and, in the 
Brazilian case, suffer a relative stagnation for environmental 
functions (Young, 2005). 
Therefore, for the widespread dissemination of water-
related PES systems in Brazil, the effective implementation of 
water billing is fundamental, as considered by the Brazilian 
Federal Water Law (No. 9,433/2007). This could generate the 
required funding for a large-scale expansion of initiatives 
such as the Oasis Project. 
Other possible funding sources are: 
  Royalties from hydropower generation;
  Water resources funds; 
  Resources from fines and other non-compliance charges 
from companies that are not properly adjusted to the 
environmental legislation and standards.
Thus, the identification of direct benefits of forest 
conservation (in this case, water supply and quality) is an 
important tool to convince companies associated to water 
resources (water supply, hydroelectricity, irrigation) to 
sponsor the Project and guarantee its financial sustainability. 
Conversely, the risks of future funding problems are higher 
where the sponsorship is made by donations or fiscal transfers 
dissociated from water services (for example, royalties from 
oil and gas exploitation).
Monitoring 
The establishment of a monitoring system is a key issue for 
the success of a PES initiative. It requires a precise definition 
of parameters to be evaluated in all the dimensions that are 
considered (environmental, economic, and social). These 
parameters should be defined ex-ante, in the planning stage of 
the program, in order to avoid conflicts due to changes in the 
evaluation criteria after the properties are enrolled. 
The objective of these indicators is to provide the necessary 
information to verify the evolution of the program in terms 
of the desired targets. Conversely, these data, when crossed 
with information from other watersheds or micro-regions 
with similar characteristics, can provide evidence (or lack 
thereof) regarding changes that the PES implementation 
brings to environmental quality and human welfare in the 
affected areas. These indicators can be divided in five groups: 
water, forest conservation, financial, social, and agricultural 
practices. 
Water indicators can be divided in two sub-groups: water 
quality and quantity. Forest conservation indicators include 
the proportion of the property area under conservation or 
restoration and whether privately established protected areas 
(RPPNs – reservas particulares do patrimônio natural) are present 
in the property. RPPNs are conservation units established 
in privately owned land, and regulated by the Brazilian Law 
on Protected Areas (Law No. 9,985/2000), and its existence 
reveals a strong commitment of the landowner to nature 
conservation. 
The agricultural quality index can be composed by the 
presence of best practices, such as certified organic agriculture, 
rotation of cultivations, and contour plowing/farming. 
Financial indicators analyze the change in production costs 
due to the practices induced by the PES. Social indicators 
refer to changes in the quality of life within the families that 
are benefitted, including monetary income, consumption 
patterns, and indicators for health and housing conditions. 
Finally, there should be “satisfaction” indicators among the 
rural producers, based on their perception regarding whether 
perceived changes related to the PES are positive and negative. 
With these indicators, aggregate performance indices can 
be constructed. The main problem is establishing weights in 
order to aggregate information. The international experience 
demonstrates that synthesis indicators are not necessarily the 
best method for evaluation, and multi-variable comparisons 
can be employed, such as the Costa Rican experience of PES 
evaluation (Moreno, 2011). Figure 1 presents a hypothetical 
example of a “radar” system on the evolution of different 
performance indicators.
In practical terms, the costs of monitoring are an obstacle 
for its implementation. In the case of Apucarana, municipal 
staff visit rural properties twice a year to verify the status of 
conservation, and to certify that management measures are 
being taken at the proposed level. However, no monitoring 
of water flow indicators has yet been established. In order to 
avoid this gap, proper estimation of monitoring costs and the 
decision of who is responsible to pay for them are essential, 
and should be defined at the beginning of the project.
Conclusion
PES is a possibility for improving the efficacy of environmental 
policy through the establishment of incentives to economic 
agents that assume a pro-conservation attitude, usually doing 
more than required by the legal system. PES initiatives have 
a great potential as an alternative strategy for conservation 
activities in Brazil but, among other requirements, they 
require the definition of adequate methodologies to evaluate 
how much landowners should receive as compensation.
Fig. 1 – Hypothetical example of a radar indicators. Source: Own 
elaboration.
Water Resources
Financial Forest
Conservation
Agricultural
Practices Social
2011
2012
Radar Indicators
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This study examined the formula adopted in the Oasis 
Project, one of the most widespread PES system in Brazil 
devoted to the water/forest conservation relationship. It 
is argued that the establishment of a payment scheme 
combining the opportunity cost of land and indices for the 
quality and quantity of conservation (considering water 
resources, natural areas conservation, and best agricultural 
practices) observed in the property guarantee more efficiency 
in the implementation of the PES, in terms of the conservation 
area that can be achieved using the same financial resources. 
Nevertheless, it is also recognized that there are other 
important challenges: the involvement of local authorities 
(“ownership”) with the Project, obtaining sustainable sources 
of the funding necessary for the payments, and monitoring 
the performance of the properties and evaluating the program 
itself. These challenges are not specific to the Oasis Project, 
and represent a common issue with other PES programs. 
There remains considerable work in the improvement of these 
initiatives; the acknowledgment of the problems and gaps yet 
to be filled should be perceived as an incentive for further 
research and experimentation, rather than as obstacles to 
deter their implementation. 
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Appendix 1 
Variables and grades proposed to the 
Oasis Project.
Does the property have all the 
requirements for the project?
Yes
No
Part of the property is private 
reserve (RPPN)? 
Yes
No
The permanent preservation 
areas are in good condition?
Mostly yes.
Permanent area protection 
with predominantly forest 
vegetation, but with evidence 
of degradation in the past.
Permanent area protection 
degraded, with restoration 
plan implemented.
Permanent area protection 
degraded, with restoration 
plan not implemented or 
without restoration plan.
Are there legal reserves 
formed by native vegetation 
and in good condition?
Mostly yes and no 
management.
Mostly yes and with low 
impact management.
Legal reserve degraded but 
recovery plan implemented.
Legal reserve degraded, 
with restoration plan not 
implemented or without 
restoration plan, or 
conventional management.
Legal reserve in forest 
easement.
Is there an area of native 
vegetation beyond the 
permanent protection area 
and legal reserve? (indicate 
the size of the surplus area in 
hectares)
Yes, there is a large 
successional area.
Yes, there is an average 
successional stage area. 
Yes, there is a small 
successional stage area.
No
Robertson N & Wunder S, 2005. Fresh tracks in the forest: assessing 
incipient payments for environmental services initiatives in Bolivia. 
Bogor (Indonesia): CIFOR.
Rolón JE et al., 2011. The Mexican PES programme: targeting 
for higher efﬁciency in environmental protection and poverty 
alleviation. In Rapidel B et al. (Eds.). Ecosystem Services from 
Agriculture and Agroforestry: Measurement and Payment. London: 
Earthscan. p. 289–304.
Wunder S, 2005. Payments for environmental services: some nuts and 
bolts. No. 42. Jakarta: CIFOR.
Young CEF, 2005. Financial Mechanisms for Conservation in 
Brazil. Conservation Biology 19(3):756-761. 
Young CEF et al., 2012. Implementing payments for ecosystem 
services in Brazil: lessons from the Oasis Project. In: XII Biennial 
Conference of the International Society for Ecological Economics 
(ISEE), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Young CEF et al., 2009. Land Opportunity Cost: a Proposal to Avoid 
Deforestion. In Dias PLS et al (Eds.). Public Policy, Mitigation and 
Adaptation to Climate Change in South America. São Paulo: IEA/
USP. p. 117-136.
Zanella M, 2012. Why do farmers join payments for environmental 
services (PES) schemes?: an assessment of PES-water project 
participation in Brazil. [MSc dissertation] Berlin: Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin.
Do the areas of native 
vegetation in the property, 
besides the RPPN and the legal 
reserve, constitute a single 
block ≥ 10 hectares?
Yes
No
Should areas ≥ 10 hectares 
that belong to more than 
one property be considered 
and the value proportionally 
divided?
Yes
No
Are RPPNs not included in this 
matter? 
Yes 
No
Areas of native vegetation 
(including legal reserve, but 
not permanent protection 
area) are connected to the 
native area of a neighbor?
No
One neighbor
Two neighbors
Three or more neighbors
The legal reserve is connected 
with permanent protection 
area?
Yes
No
Are there springs with a 
permanent conservation area 
preserved?
No springs on the property
One spring with permanent 
protection area preserved.
Two springs with permanent 
protection area preserved.
Three springs with 
permanent protection area 
preserved.
Four springs with permanent 
protection area preserved.
Five springs with permanent 
protection area preserved.
Six springs with permanent 
protection area preserved.
Seven or more springs with 
permanent protection area 
preserved.
Is there organic production? 
(certified production)
Yes, only
Yes, partly
No
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Has a system of sewage 
treatment more than 100 
meters removed from the 
nearest watercourse?
Yes
No
Has hedges or windbreaks 
made exclusively with native 
species?
Yes
No
Has hedges or windbreaks 
made exclusively with native 
species?
Yes
No
Appendix 2 
Variables and grades proposed to the Oasis Project.
Sub-Groups Parameters Answers Other Information
SPRINGS 1.1)   Protected springs 0.5 Yes
0 No
1.2)   Existence of 
rivers, streams, or 
natural lakes protected
0.5 Yes
0 No
CONSERVATION 2.1) Formation of 
corridors
0.25 Yes Connectivity between internal 
natural areas (LR/RPPN/ surplus)
0.25 Yes Connectivity between natural areas 
inside and outside (with neighbors)
0 No  
2.2) Existence of 
private reserves (RPPN)
0.5 Yes
0 No
2.3) Natural area 1 Successional 
advanced/medium 
stage (x1)
x1/(x1 + x2)*1
0.5 Early successional 
stage (x2)
x2/(x1 + x2)*0.5
0 Degraded  
2.4) % Conservation 
area
0.5 Yes Relationship between conservation 
area (x1) and total area (y2): 
measures the effort (in area) for 
conservation of the producer, 
compensating for not using the 
area for production
0 No
AGRICULTURE 3.1) Certified organic 
agriculture
0.33 Yes
0 No
3.2) Straw 0.33 Yes
0 No
3.3) Contour plowing/
farming
0.33 Yes
0 No
3.4) Protective 
action of the natural 
area (supervision, 
information signs, etc.)
0.5 Yes
0 No
